Michigan Law Review
Volume 52

Issue 8

1954

HEARSAY AND CONSPIRACY: A REEXAMINATION OF THE COCONSPIRATORS' EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE
Joseph H. Levie
Member, New York Bar

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Joseph H. Levie, HEARSAY AND CONSPIRACY: A REEXAMINATION OF THE CO-CONSPIRATORS'
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1159 ().
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol52/iss8/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1954]

HEARSAY AND CONSPIRACY

1159

HEARSAY AND CONSPIRACY
A

REEXAMINATION oF THE Co-CoNsPIRATORs' ExcEPTION TO THE
HEARSAY RuLE

Joseph H. Levie*

T

expansion of the law of conspiracy and the increasing number
of prosecutions for its violation have been much commented on
lately.1 Many kinds of anti-social conduct directed principally against
the public welfare are now frequently punished by prosecution for
conspiracy instead of prosecution for the substantive offense. Conspiracy is an ideal way to deal with organized crime and has been used
extensively against quasi-treasonous activities. Similarly the Sherman
Act's2 criminal sanctions are primarily couched in terms of conspiracy
and the civil conspiracy action for divestiture or dissolution is the usual
method of enforcing the antitrust laws. This emphasis on conspiracy
is advanced most frequently in the federal courts but is not restricted
to them. 3
Two sources have fed this development. First, some actions which
are conspiracies are not otherwise criminal. The illegal agreement·
already punishable as a conspiracy may never ripen into the substantive crime. Furthermore, the object of the conspiracy need not be
criminal in itself. 4 Second, prosecution for conspiracy offers the prosecutor practical advantages. Many defendants may be tried jointly"
which makes trials cheaper and easier. Venue may be more advantageously set.6 Finally-and it is to this aspect that the present article
is directed-the usual rules of evidence, particularly the hearsay rule,
HE

"'Member, New York Bar; First Lieutenant, J.A.G., United States Army.-Ed.
Jackson concurring in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 at 572-577, 71
S.Ct. 857 (1951), and Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 at 445, 69 S.Ct. 716
(1949); STEFFEN, CASES ON AGENCY, 2d ed., 632-651 (1952); MICHAEL & WECHSLER,
CruMINAL LAw AND !Ts .ADMINISTRATION 636-687 (1940); notes: 17 UNIV. Cm. L. REv.
148 (1949); 62 HARv. L. REv. 276 (1948); Hamo, "Intent in Criminal Conspiracy," 89
UNIV, PA. L. REv. 624 (1941).
2 15 U.S.C. (1946) §§1-2. See Paramount Pictures v. United Motion Picture
Theatre Owners, (3d Cir. 1937) 93 F. (2d) 714.
3 Conspiracy is a federal felony under 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §371. In most
states it is a misdemeanor only as it was at common law. See MICHAEL & WECHSLER,
CRIMINAL LAw AND In .ADMINISTRATION 636-637 (1940).
4 See cases collected MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAw AND !Ts ADMINISTRATION 639-648 (1940),
5 Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. Rule 8(b).
6 A conspiracy may be tried in any district where an overt act was committed as well
as the district in which it was hatched. Brown v. Elliot, 225 U.S. 392, 32 S.Ct. 812
(1912). See 1 HoLMEs-PoLLOCK LETI'ERS, Howe ed.,193-199 (1941) for a spirited discussion of this point.
1 Justice
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offer the prosecution tactical advantages. Expansion of the substantive
law of conspiracy has been paralleled by relaxation of the hearsay rule.
Essentially a conspiracy is only an unlawful agreement. Prosecutors did not rely on conspiracy until late in the nineteenth century.7
Then its use became more frequent and its expansion in the past
twenty years has been very marked. Typically the reason given for
making the agreement itself criminal is that concerted action is so much
more dangerous to the public that the combination itself should be
punished.8 But its very nature makes conspiracy hard to prove. Proving the existence of a plot is hard and it may be very difficult to connect
some parties to it. This becomes acute in a mass trial (as many con. spiracy trials are)9 where some defendants are clearly implicated in
the confederacy and others are not. Since, putting the overt act aside,1°
all that is necessary to convict for conspiracy is a subjective meeting of
minds regarding the criminal aim, direct proof is impossible. The
closest approximation would be the reduction of the agreement to
writing-which is very rare, and it would be even rarer for such a
document to come into the hands of the authorities. Unless a conspirator obligingly turns state's evidence there remain only two other
methods of proof, circumstantial evidence and the conspirators' own
declarations. Neither is completely free from difficulty.
Circumstantial evidence is said by the courts to be much favored
in conspiracy cases.11 Typically, the jury is asked to draw an inference
of agreement from conduct which seems to be following some plan.
But such use of circumstantial hypothesis is subject to inherent limitations. If the conspiracy is apprehended early or discontinued there is
little conduct from which to draw the inference. Besides, alternative
explanations of whatever conduct there was may exist and make it difficult to prove guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. For example, a general rise in prices may be explained as the result either of a conspiracy
or of the law of supply and demand.
7 The history of conspiracy is long and complicated. It originated as a mixed tort and
crime (like trespass) directed at abuse of procedure. The tort of conspiracy is largely
obsolete and criminal conspiracy was reshaped by Star Chamber into a misdemeanor and
used against economic crimes. See W1:m:mLD, HxsTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND ABusB OF
LEGAL PRocEss (1921); BRYAN, DBVELOPMBNT oF THB ENGLISH LA.w oF CoNsPIRACY
(1909).
s BBNTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION, Ogden ed., _259-260 (1931).
9 See Allen v. United States, (7th Cir. 1924) 4 F. (2d) 688, affd. sub nom. Mullen
v. United States, 267 U.S. 598, 45 S.Ct. 353 (1925) (75 defendants).
10 Very little suffices to constitute an overt act. See Bartoli v. United States, ( 4th
Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 130 (telephone conversation).
11 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 34 S.Ct. 951
(1914); State v. Faillace, 134 Conn. 181, 56 A. (2d) 167 (1947).
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The last source of evidence is the use of testimonial utterances of
the conspirators against each other. Such declarations find their way
into court in many ways. The conspirators may communicate among
themselves, keep partial records for one reason or another, ask others
to join in the scheme, make statements in the course of carrying out
the conspiracy in the presence of third parties or just talk But such
statements made out of court are excluded as hearsay unless a conspirator repeats them on the stand, or they are included within one of two
special conspiracy exceptions to the hearsay rule: the so-called coconspirators' exception, one of the family of exceptions for vicarious
admissions, or a res gestae exception. The co-conspirators' exception
is by far the more important. In the subsequent discussion of these
exceptions the reader will observe how the law is changing. Perhaps
he will conclude that we were willy-nilly on the way to exempting
from the hearsay rule most statements connected with or concerning
a conspiracy and that the broadening of the substantive law of conspiracy could not have been effective without weakening the hearsay
rule-a quiet steady process long under way and hardly commented on.

I
The co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule is soon stated:
any act or declaration by one co-conspirator committed in furtherance
of the conspiracy and during its pendency is admissible against each
and every co-conspirator provided that a foundation for its reception
is laid by independent proof of the conspiracy. Often the rule is stated
in the negative: mere "narrative" declarations of the one co-conspirator
cannot be admitted against co-conspirators. All three conditions of admissibility (furtherance, pendency, foundation) resemble principles of
agency. Furtherance is "scope of employment" modified for conspiracy.
Requiring the declaration to have been made during pendency follows
logically for if the conspiracy does not exist acts cannot be within its
scope. The independent foundation finds a parallel in the rule that
agency cannot be proved by declarations of the agent alone.
The odd thing about this exception to the hearsay rule is its very
existence. Why single out conspiracy for preferential treatment? The
cases reveal three further areas of ambiguity: what declarations are "in
furtherance" of the con~piracy? How long is the pendency of a conspiracy? How much proof is required to lay the foundation? When
can it be admitted? And of what kind must it be? After a digression
to examine the history, we will take up each of these points in turn.
Like so much of that common law customarily attributed to the

1162

M1cmGAN

LAw

REVIEW

[ Vol. 52

genius of the thirteenth century or of King Alfred the Great, the
hearsay rule is certainly post-medieval.1 2 The early history of the admissions exceptions to hearsay is a mystery. Apparently the hearsay
rule, originally not very broad, was simply not extended to admissions.
They were not thought to be hearsay.13 The early history of the
vicarious admission is involved.14 In the trials for the infamous· Gordon
Riots of 1780 the cries of the mob and the banners they carried were
admitted against persons shown to be ringleaders.15 These precedents
were used to create the present co-conspirators' exception. Afterward
further vicarious exceptions were made for co-trespassers16 and copartners.1 7
The co-conspirators' exception as· we now know it was first stated
late in the eighteenth century in a series of treason trials of fellow travelers of the French Revolution,1 8 which show an amazing similarity to
recent Smith Act prosecutions.19 The treason charge was never an act
of rebellion; it was always "teaching and advocating'' the death of the
King. There was always concerted action of some sort; the defendants
had some relation to a society advocating Republicanism. Hardy and
Horne Tooke were officers of such a society. William Stone was the
Society's printer.
The American courts had already gone further in civil cases. By
1791, New Jersey was admitting all declarations made in the course of
any illegal combination. 20 Since the early English cases turned on the
substantive point of whether one party was bound by another's statements, this decision was an extension of the law to its logical extreme.
If admissions were not hearsay there was no reason for not admitting
12 For the early history of hearsay, see 9 HOLDSWORTH, HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAw
214-222 (1926).
13 Admissions were not thought of as hearsay. See GILBERT, LAw OF EVIDENCE 152
(1754); SWIFT, DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 126 (1810). This notion persisted
into modern times in a diluted form. Morgan, "Admissions and the Hearsay Rule," 30
YALE L.J. 355 (1921).
14 The early history of the vicarious exceptions, particularly the agency exception, is
extraordinarily difficult to trace. Not only are the cases confusing but since counsel was
not permitted in criminal prosecution (treason excepted) we rarely have reports of the
cases. The best discussion is 3 WmMoRE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., 1076-1086 (1940).
15Trial of George, Lord Gordon, 21 How. St. Tr. 485 at 535 (1781).
16 Morse v. Royal, 12 Ves. Jr. 355, 33 Eng. Rep. 134 at 137 (1806).
11 Nichols v. Dowding & Kemb, 1 Starkie N.P. 81, 171 Eng. Rep. 408 (1815).
lSTrial of Thomas Hardy, 24 How. St. Tr. 200, 451-458, 473-477 (1794); King v.
William Stone, 6 T.R. 527, 101 Eng. Rep. 684 (1796), full transcript as Trial of William
Stone, 25 How. St. Tr. 1155, 1270 (I 796); Trial of Home Tooke, 25 How. St. Tr. 1, 74,
126 (1794).
19 Erskine appeared for the defense in all three cases. See STRYKER, Fon THE DEFENSE:
THOMAS EnsKINE, THE MosT ENLIGHTENED LmERAL oF Hrs TxME, 1750-1823, 280343 (1947).
20 Patton v. Freeman, 1 N.J.L. (Cox) 113 (I 791).
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the declaration of a conspirator within the scope of his agency against
all confederates. The dangers of hearsay were not mentioned. Several
states,21 the English courts in the cases previously mentioned,22 and
the early text writers23 followed New Jersey. Then in the leading case
of United States v. Gooding, 24 the United States Supreme Court approved the broad doctrine. Little was added throughout the nineteenth
century. Since the crime of conspiracy was rarely invoked by prosecutors, except for trade union combinations,25 and since the broad
English law of treason out of which the rule had grown was not received
in this country,26 the exception found its main use in those crimes and
torts which happened to be committed in concert.
But when the law of conspiracy started to grow again, extensive use
of the co-conspirators' exception by the prosecution strained the rule
and left its agency rationale out of plumb with the practice. The classical view h3:rdly explains, for example, what is going on in antitrust
cases and it was repudiated by the American Law Institute's Model
Code of Evidence.21 The search for the rationale of the co-conspirators' exception is now timely. Hence we return to our first problem.
Why is there such a rule at all?
Once it was believed that admissions were not hearsay. 23 Nobody
today would adopt so naive a view. The usual reason given for the
co-conspirators' exception is the classical agency rationale that conspirators are co-agents and, as such, liable for each other's declarations. 29
Wigmore30 differs, claiming that such evidence is unusually trustworthy, like declarations against interest generally, and therefore is
admitted although hearsay. It is submitted that neither view is really
21 Broughton v. Ward, 1 Tyler (Vt.) 137 (1801); Claytor v. Anthony, 6 Rand. (Va.)
285 (1828); Reitenbach v. Reitenbach, 1 Rawle (Pa.) 361 (1829). See Woodruff v.
Whittlesey, Kirby (Conn.) 60 (1786).
22 See note 18 supra. The English cases have had much inHuence in Americaperhaps even more than the early American cases. See also Nichols v. Dowding and Kempt,
1 Starkie N.P. 81, 171 Eng. Rep. 408 (1815) (Lord Ellenborough); Rex v. Hammond
and Webb, 2 Esp. 719, 170 Eng. Rep. 508 (1793) (Lord Kenyon).
23 PHILLIPS, LAw oP EVIDENCE 74 (1st Amer. ed. 1816); 2 STAIIKill, LAw oP EVIDENCE 403 (1823).
24 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 459 (1827).
25 GREGORY, LAlloR AND nm LAw, rev. ed., 18-30 (1949). Criminal conspiracy became
obsolete and was replaced by the civil injunction within a few years.
26 U.S. CONST., Art. III, §3, cl. 1.
21 A.L.I. MoDBL CoDE oP Evm:sNcE, Rule 508(b) (1942).
28 See note 13 supra.
20 See Van Riper v. United States, (2d Cir. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 961; Morgan, ''The
Rationale of Vicarious Admissions," 42 HAnv. L. REv. 461 (1929) is the classic statement
on the subject. See also Thayer, "Declaration as Part of the Res Gestae: III,'' 15 AM. L.
REv. 71 at 80 (1881).
30 4 W1GMORE, EvmENcE, 3d ed., §1080a (1940). According to Wigmore this is the
rationale for all the vicarious admissions.
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defensible, and that the true reason, aside from brute history, for admitting such evidence is the very great probative need for it.
Both as the official doctrine and because of its substantial effect in
determining the exception's scope,· the agency rationale should be discussed first. Learned Hand has said:
"Such declarations are admitted upon no doctrine of the law
of evidel)ce, but of the substantive law of crime. When men enter
into an agreement for an unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents
for one another, and-have made 'a partnership in crime.' What
one does pursuant to their common purpose, all do, and as declarations may be such acts, they are competent against all."31
Or, to put it another way, a conspiracy is a species of agency, and
preferential treatment for agent's hearsay is one of the incidents of
agency. But why should it be? Several reasons are advanced.
The oldest one is that the conspirators' words are somehow interwoven into their acts. This is a res gestae notion of the sort which
Thayer thinks may be the original source of many of the hearsay
exceptions. 32 One of the older statements is still the best. Starkie said:
'Where several combine together for the same illegal purpose,
each is the agent of all the rest, and any act by one in furtherance
of the unlawful design is, in consideration of law, the act of all
and, as a declaration accompanying an act strongly indicates the
nature and intention of the act, or, more properly, perhaps, is to
be considered as part of the act, a declaration made by one conspirator at the time of doing an act in furtherance of the common
design is evidence against the other conspirators."33
This does not explain the cases. As the above quotation from Learned
Hand points out, the declaration is admitted as an act, not to illuminate some unclear act. The administrative difficulties of such an exception are enormous-when is an act unclear? When do words make it
clearer? Nor does it explain why preferential treatment should be
given conspirators' hearsay. Hearsay is excluded partly because the
witness is likely to report it poorly but principally because the true
declarant cannot be cross-examined. There is no showing how such
evidence is trustworthy enough to justify omitting cross-examination.
Notions of waiver provide another argument. If a man associates
himself with a group ( which must be independently proved) then it
is only fair to ·charge him with his associates' statements. True, but
31 Van Riper v. United States, (2d Cir. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 961 at 967.
s2 THAYER, PRELIMINARY TRBATisB oN EvmBNcB AT THE CoMMoN I.Aw
88 2· STARKIB, I.Aw oP EvmBNCB 403 (1824).

523 (1898).
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why waive the hearsay rule? These statements are not likely to be well
reported or particularly trustworthy. Hearsay is a rule of evidence; such
notions confuse procedural and substantive law without good reason.
Lastly we reach the best argument for the agency exception to the
hearsay rule. This argument, which deserves our serious attention, is
that there has been in fact no deprivation of the right to cross-examination. 34 The original declarant is the principal himself who gave his
agent instructions. He can hardly wish to cross-examine himself and,
if he does, he can take the stand. Yet defendants in criminal cases may
have legitimate reasons for not wishing to take the stand. Passing over
that, the argument succeeds only if there are two conspirators, one to
make the original declaration and one to repeat the hearsay. Suppose,
however, that there are more than two and the original declarant and
the party opposing the admission of the hearsay are not the same. The
opponent cannot call the original declarant; the privilege against selfincrimination will be interposed, depriving him of his cross-examination. Nor is good reporting particularly likely. On the contrary, the
hearsay repeated by the declarant-conspirator will be a true report only
if it is in his interest. It may well be in the interest of a conspirator to
misstate his instructions either to shift responsibility or to give a false
impression of the aims of the conspiracy.
The agency argument accordingly fails because it shows no reason
for exempting conspirators' utterances from the hearsay rule. To say
that the substantive law does so only begs the question. The rules of
agency govern the substantive law of conspiracy; they decide who is a
member of the conspiracy. As such they are involved in determining
against whom the evidence may be admitted. The point is that they
are not relevant in determining why it should be admitted.
Wigmore's theory that such declarations are admitted because they
are trustworthy (and accordingly the need for cross-examination is less
acute) fares no better. Wigmore argues35 that since the interest of all
conspirators is identical, an admission of one against his interest is
against the interest of each. This fails to distinguish between declarations showing the existence of a conspiracy and declarations concerning
its membership or aims. Of course sane men do not falsely admit to
conspiracy. Conspirators' declarations are good to prove that some
conspiracy exists but less trustworthy to show its aims and membership.
The conspirator's interest is likely to lie in misleading the listener into
34 See Morgan, "The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions," 42 HARv. L. REv. 461 at
463 (1929).
85 See note 30 supra.
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believing the conspiracy stronger with more members (and different
members) and other aims than in fact it has. It is no victory for common sense to make a belief that criminals are notorious for their veracity the basis for law.
We must conclude therefore that neither of these proposed rationales of agency or of trustworthiness is very impressive. Meanwhile the
co-conspirators' exception has expanded rather than shrunk which is
not typical of rules without a reason. The true reason for the exception
explains both its growth and the parallelism of that expansion to the
expansion of the law of conspiracy. That reason is simple: there is
great probative need for such testimony. Conspiracy is a hard thing to
prove. The substantive law of conspiracy has vastly expanded. This
created a tension solved by relaxation in the law of evidence. Conspirators' declarations are admitted out of necessity.
If then, conspirators' evidence is admitted out of necessity it remains
subject to all the dangers of hearsay; and declarations of conspirators
are likely to be overestimated by juries.36 The problem facing the
courts then becomes: how shall conspirators' evidence be admitted and
used but kept within the limits of fairness to defendants? What protections have been erected to protect defendants? What protections
should be added?
The simplest answer is to require corroboration of the conspirators'
declarations. This is done by the rule forbidding conviction solely on
the testimony of accomplices, if interpreted to include the declarations
of conspirators.37 The federal jurisdiction where conspiracy prosecutions are most frequent has no such rule. 38
Another way to protect defendants is to require a high standard of
"legal relevancy."39 Conspirators' declarations would be generally
admitted but only when trustworthy. 40 This is largely a matter for the
trial courts. The appellate courts will not (probably cannot) review
their trial courts' determinations of relevancy except in the unusual
text thereto for fuller discussion of this point.
corroboration of accomplice testimony is statutory, the
wording of the individual statute governs. See note 94 infra and the text thereto for fuller
discussion.
.
38 See note 95 infra and text thereto. A few federal cases go even further and forbid
the use of statements made among the conspirators to identify a third person as a coconspirator.
89 Foi: this paper ''Relevancy" connotes logical pertinency.
''Materiality" requires
logical pertinency and an actual contribution in probative force substantial enough to outweigh any improper prejudice and administrative difficulties that the evidence may cause.
40 What is meant here is that only the more trustworthy declarations are to be admitted
among conspirators' declarations and not that conspirators'. declarations are necessarily
always trustworthy.
36 See note 97 infra and the
37 Since the rule requiring
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case which is .Hagrantly wrong. Instead a general rule of relevancy is
sometimes laid down removing a particular situation from the determination of the trial court. For example, evidence of subsequent repairs by a railroad cannot be admitted in grade crossing accidents to
prove negligence by the railroad prior to the accident.41 Here the rules
of legal relevancy have been crystallized. The same thing might well
be done for conspirators' declarations-they might be generally admitted
but under certain circumstances held to be per se irrelevant. Sometimes the courts seem to move -in this direction as when they exclude
certain declarations of conspirators as "merely narrative." 42 The agency
theory has been pushed aside. This is the best and most realistic way
to deal with conspirators' hearsay and most befits the responsibility of
appellate courts to their trial courts.
The usual practice, however, is to protect defendants by keeping the
agency rules in force. Holding to the agency rules is better than leaving
defendants without protection, and defendants are never in greater
danger than when a superficially clever court sees through the agency
rationale and fails to replace it with anything else. But the law suffers,
for if the agency rules are kept to protect defendants, the strain distorts
them. There is pressure to admit all conspirators' declarations and there
is counter-pressure to protect defendants. Since neither of these forces
is related to the law of agency, the cases concerning the co-conspirators'
exception are notoriously unsatisfactory. We shall examine the three
requirements of furtherance, pendency and foundation to see what the
courts are actually doing. We cannot expect much clarity, for one doctrine (agency) is either being used in behalf of some other doctrine
(necessity, defendants' protection) or else when applied following its
own rationale comes in conflict with more important principles (hearsay). Justice may be done in individual cases but the rules of law are
obscure and sometimes unsatisfactory.

II
We turn now to the requirement that the declaration be "in furtherance of the conspiracy." The requirement is based upon that agency
rationale which we have already found unsatisfactory. It is equivalent
to the requirement that an agent's act or declaration must be within the
scope of his agency before it can be charged against his principal.
v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 193 N.C. 670, 139 S.E. 232 (1927). See 2
EvmBNCE, 3d ed., 283 (1940).
42 Exclusion of "narrative" details gives an excellent opportunity to shut out facts
insufficiently connected.
41 Shelton

W1cMoRB,
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Practical considerations limit such an operation of the requirement and
it is often ignored, rejected or criticized.
One practical problem lies on the threshold. How can the court
determine what is in furtherance of the conspiracy when the declaration admitted may be practically the only evidence of the terms of the
illegal agreement? 43 This by itself often makes it impossible to apply
agency rules strictly and therefore they are not applied. The courts
avoid this problem by loose application of the agency principles defining "furtherance." If some connection is established between the
declaration and the conspiracy, then the declaration is taken as in furtherance of the conspiracy. This considerably weakens the practical
importance of limiting conspirators' admissions to those in furtherance
of the conspiracy. An example may make the point clearer. In Vitagraph Company v. Perelman44 a conspiracy to stop double featuring,
constituting a violation of the antitrust laws, existed among certain distributors of motion pictures. One member of the conspiracy made a
speech before an industry meeting detailing what had been done previously to stop the practice and what the conspirators proposed to do
in the future. The other conspirators were present and remained silent,
but plaintiff did not show that they had authorized the speech. A good
argument could have been made that under agency law the declarations
were unauthorized, but the hearsay was admitted. Admission of the
speech can be explained on the basis that the opponents of admission,
by remaining silent, had adopted the declaration. 45 It seems easier to
explain the case as one where the court adopted an unusually broad
view of agency. They looked for a nexus, some connection between
the declaration and the conspiracy. When they found it-here mere
propinquity-they did not examine the law of agency carefully.46 No
doubt the opponents of admission would be permitted to come forward
with evidence to prove that the declarations were not in fact authorized. In effect the burden of coming forward has been shifted. To
prevent the admission of conspirators' declarations the opponents of the
evidence are forced to present more evidence about the terms of the
conspiracy.
43 Jn the federal courts the corroborating evidence need only show a joint venture and
the hearsay may be used to prove the illegality. See note 92 infra.
44 (3d Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 142.
45 Such cases where silence is held to imply assent furnish still another way to avoid
furtherance. Cf. State v. Murray, 216 N.C. 681, 6 S.E. (2d) 513 (1940); annotation 80
A.L.R. 1243 (1932).
46 For a similar view of the relation of agency law, see Harvey v. United States, (2d
Cir. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 561 (excellent opinion of Swan, C.J.).
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Practical considerations permit the trial judge to be more liberal
than the letter of the law. Admission of evidence is always subject to
some discretion in the trial judge but appellate courts often remark
that his latitude is unusually broad in conspiracy cases,47 because conspiracies are hard to prove. The appellate courts frequently divest
themselves of too close a supervision over their trial courts by the harmless error rule.
Beyond these practical considerations which operate to allow trial
courts to be liberal in admitting conspirators' declarations, there are
changes in the substantive law which abolish or limit furtherance as
a condition of inadmissibility. The Model Code of Evidence, adopted
by the American Law Institute, would abolish furtherance. 48
California49 and Georgia50 have statutes which can be interpreted
to abolish. this condition of admissibility. The courts have wavered in
interpreting them, sometimes assimilating them to the common law
(thus requiring furtherance) and sometimes not. Other courts have
gotten rid of the requirements without a statute. The Seventh Circuit
blandly explains that "furtherance of the conspiracy" refers to the content of the declaration, not to the circumstances under which it was
made.51 A little reflection leads to the conclusion that this is total
admissibility because if its content did not concern furtherance of the
conspiracy, the declaration would be immaterial. There is some state
authority for the same position52 and instances abound where the requirement has been ignored or evaded by means of the harmless error
rule. 53
The Supreme Court has begun to clarify its position. In Krulewitch
v. United States54 Justice Black, speaking for the Court, doubted the
47 McNeil v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1936) 85 F. (2d) 698 at 703; Barkley v.
United States, (4th Cir. 1933) 66 F. (2d) 74; McCutchan v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.,
(Mo. App. 1938) 122 S.W. (2d) 59 (civil case).
48 See note 27 supra.
.
49 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (1870) subd. 6, uses "related to the conspiracy." Compare
the interpretation of People v. Curtis, 106 Cal. App. (2d) 321, 235 P. (2d) 51 (1951)
with that of People v. Singh, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 729, 37 P. (2d) 481 (1934).
50 38 Ga. Code Ann. (1937) 306. Compare Pressley v. State, 205 Ga. 197, 53 S.E.
(2d) 106 (1949); Stone v. State, 76 Ga. App. 96, 45 S.E. (2d) 89, and Lance v. State,
166 Ga. 15, 142 S.E. 105 (1928).
51 International Indemnity Co. v. Lehman, (7th Cir. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 1. See also
D'Allessandro v. United States, (3d Cir. 1937) 90 F. (2d) 640; Ladrey v. United States,
(D.C. Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 417.
52 Pressley v. State, 205 Ga. 197, 53 S.E. (2d) 106 (1949) (excellent dissent by
Heed, J.); State v. Bundy, 147 Kan. 4, 75 P. (2d) 236 (1938).
53 E.g., Commonwealth v. Shea, 323 Mass. 406, 82 N.E. (2d) 511 (1948); On harmless error, see Frank, C.J., dissenting in United States v. Rubenstein, (2d Cir. 1945) 151
F. (2d) 915 at 919.
54 336 U.S. 440, 69 S.Ct. 716 (1949).
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wisdom of preferential treatment for conspirators' hearsay but found
the law well established. Further expansion was disapproved and,
since any stick will do to beat a dog, the Court declared that declarations
not made in furtherance of the "main aim" were inadmissible. This
position will be difficult to maintain. Logically, furtherance derives
from that agency rationale which the Court rejects and can only be
denned by using agency notions. Probably the Court will either
further discourage conspiracy prosecutions by still further limiting the
co-conspirators' exception-and it clearly recognized the intimate relation between preferential treatment for conspirators' hearsay and
conspiracy prosecutions-or else the Krulewitch case will be undermined. The Seventh Circuit's Pickwickian definition of furtherance
may be adopted or Krulewitch may be distinguished away. This last
possibility is quite real since the disputed declarations are inadmissible
in any case as made after termination of the conspiracy.55
Still another path to free admission of conspirators' declarations
runs through manipulation of res gestae exceptions. This ought to
be distinguished from res gestae as the rationale for the whole exception. By use of this doctrine a declaration made by any conspirator
during the pendency of the conspiracy becomes part of the res gestae
of the conspiracy. There is no reason in the world for such a conclusion and it amounts to abolishing the requirement of furtherance. 56
Finally there are the civil antitrust cases.57 In this important field
of conspiracy law the requirement of furtherance seems to be largely
inoperative although the courts sometimes refer to it. There are no
cases where evidence has been excluded because it was not in furtherance of the conspiracy. On the other hand, at least one trial court
has abandoned the whole hearsay rule· for civil antitrust cases with155 Id.

at 442.
v. United States, (9th Cir. 1910) 179 F. 584 overruled Mayola v. United
States, (9th Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 65. See also Shea v. United States, (6th Cir. 1918)
251 F. 440.
57 See Schine Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 at 116, 68 S.Ct. 947 (1948);
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 at 388, 68 S.Ct. 525 (1948);
United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 at 184, 65 S.Ct. 254 (1944);
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, (6th Cir. 1944) 147 F. (2d) 93 at 118, affd.
328 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. 1125 (1946); United States v. Imperial Chemicals, (D.C. N.Y.
1952) 100 F. Supp. 504 at 512; United States v. General Electric, (D.C. N.J. 1949) 82
F. Supp. 753 at 785; United States v. Libby Owens, Ford Glass et al., (D.C. Ohio),
unreported. See Tr. 3037; United States v. Hartford Empire, (D.C. Ohio 1942) 46 F.
Supp. 541 at 553. Since the evidence is primarily documentary in most of these cases the
business records exception to the Hearsay Rule, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1732, is
often relevant.
156 Jones

1954]

HEARSAY AND CoNSPmACY

1171

out a jury,58 and another abandoned furtherance outright.59 Most of
these cases are tried by a judge without a jury. The trial judge may
be trusted to weigh hearsay fairly and the extraordinary protections of
the criminal law do not apply. The evidence is often predominately
documentary. Finally, the activity of the conspiracy is so diverse that
almost anything is in furtherance of it. As one able trial court said:
'Whether a declru:ation is in furtherance of a conspiracy must
perforce turn upon the scope and extent of conspiracy. When
the alleged conspirators are large corporations, doing a worldwide
business, with seats of authority geographically distant one from
another, numerous internal communications within each corporation are necessary in order to appraise large numbers of corporate
officers of the nature of the negotiations, the attitude of the representatives of other co-conspirators, the decisions reached, their
import and the understanding of the agents of the corporation of
the decisions reached. . . . Moreover in a conspiracy which continues over many years, which has been adapted to changed
conditions, which has altered techniques and tactics from time to
time and where the individuals operating the affairs of the corporate members of the conspiracy have changed with the passing
of years, the keeping of records of past agreements and understandings, the preparation of summaries of past relationships between the parties and the making of reports are in aid of the overaII purpose. . . . "60
The observant reader will have noted that narrative declarations of
past occurrences can be in furtherance of such a conspiracy. Probably the law is progressing toward abolishing the hearsay rule in civil
antitrust cases but criminal antitrust cases should not provide any
exception to whatever co-conspirator limitations remain. 61
Taken together all of these limitations cast very serious doubt on
the practical utility of requiring declarations to be in furtherance of
the conspiracy. At least so far as we can discover from appellate
reports only "merely narrative" declarations are excluded. Frequently
58 United States v. United Shoe, (D.C. Mass. 1950) 89 F. Supp. 349 (Wyzanski, D.J.).
The court pointed out that the F.T.C. can consider hearsay in a like case and a district
judge should be as competent in the weighing of evidence as an administrative agency.
For a general discussion of evidence in a trial without jury, see 46 Ju.. L. R:sv. 915 (1952).
50 United States v. Vehicular Parking, (D.C. Del. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 751.
60 Ryan, D.J., in United States v. Imperial Chemicals, (D.C. N.Y. 1952) 100 F.
Supp. 504 at 512. See also Zamloch v. United States, (9th Cir. 1952) 193 F. (2d) 889,
not an antitrust case where narrative declarations of past events were in actual furtherance
of the conspiracy.
61 United States v. Food and Grocery Bureau of S. California, (D.C. Cal. 1942) 43
F. Supp. 966 at 969, affd. (10th Cir. 1943) 139 F. (2d) 973.
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these cases in which a conspirator tells of past actions involve confessions to the police while the conspiracy is still pending.
Only the most extreme error produces reversal. Yet not every
declaration made during a conspiracy need be admitted, especially
where a jury sits. There must be some way to separate useful evidence from lies and gossip spread in the course of a criminal scheme.
It is suggested that the proper practice would be to admit declarations
made during the pendency of a conspiracy unless the declaration is
self-serving. 62 A conspirator's hearsay declaration exculpating himself at the expense of others is too prejudicial in proportion to its
probable truth. Let the conspirator turn state's evidence if he wishes
and appear on the stand to be sworn, cross-examined and confront
those he accuses. . Hearsay is weak enough; self-serving hearsay ought
not to be regularly admitted into evidence. If the trial court screens
out irrelevant evidence and self-serving declarations, the purposes
served by this condition of admissibility are satisfied and it could be
dispensed with.

III
The second condition of admissibility requires the declaration to
have been made "during the pendency of the conspiracy." Pendency
is the actual duration of the illegal agreement; those declarations made
before the conspiracy was hatched and after its termination are inadmissible. Declarations during its term are admissible even though
made prior to the cut-off date of the statute of limitations or at a time
when the agreement was not criminal. 63
Once a declaration is admitted it incriminates all conspirators including those who join in the conspiracy afterward. 64 The afterentering partner accepted the terms of the illegal bargain and ratified
prior action. Any other holding would make that bargain unprovable
against him.
Declarations made before the illegal bargain was struck are mere
predictions. The illegal agreement is still in the future; no accurate
statement can be made about terms or parties. Such statements are
"legally irrelevant," i.e., too lacking in probative force to be admitted.
The prejudicial effect of their admission would outweigh their probative value.
62See Watson v. Davidson, 141 Ark. 591, 217 S.W. 777 (1920); State v. Warren,
242 Iowa 1176, 47 N.W. (2d) 221 (1951).
63 United States v. Dennis, (2d Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 201, affd. 341 U.S. 494, 71
S.Ct. 857 (1951).
64 United States v. United States Gypsum, 333 U.S. 364 at 388, 68 S.Ct. 525 (1948).

1954]

HEARSAY AND CoNsPIBACY

1173

Declarations made after the conspiracy ends are particularly untrustworthy. Once the conspiracy terminates, the interest of every
member is to avoid responsibility and shift the blame. What he says
about himself by way of admission or confession may well be true and
is, at any rate, against his own interest. But what he says about others
may be based on spite, fear, pique, malice, a desire to stand well with
the prosecutor, or many other motives not leading to truth. Direct
knowledge may be wanting, for although a conspirator is responsible
for his partners' acts, he need not be well informed about them. In
a "loose" conspiracy he knows little about specific acts. 65
The case for admitting only declarations made during the pendency of the conspiracy resembles that for furtherance. Any declaration made while the conspiracy is pending is risky, and the conspirator's interest in avoiding responsibility is balanced by his desire
for criminal gains. Similar results follow from an agency rationale.
For if declarations are admitted because a legal relationship exists, then
admissibility ends with the relationship.
This condition of admissibility makes furtherance superB.ous. Both
conditions screen out declarations which might have been exclusively
to absolve the declarant by incriminating another. If either is effective, the other is unnecessary. Most statements excluded are in both
categories; but probably furtherance adds nothing to pendency which
is free of some of the complications furtherance entails.
The actual cases are not as neat as these generalizations. So great
is the hunger for evidence of conspiracy that some courts even admit
declarations made prior to the illegal contract against all subsequent
conspirators. And the definition of when the conspiracy terminates
is difficult and manipulated to admit late admissions.
Those few cases which admit declarations made before the conspiracy are freaks. The avenue used is the exception for statements
of motive66 and the reasoning is this: declarations of motive are admissible; a declaration regarding a conspiracy made before the agreement is a declaration of motive; ergo, such a declaration is admissible
against all conspirators. The non sequitur is plain. Assuming that
the declarant is bound by his declarations of motive why admit them
against accomplices? Whatever his statements about his own intentions may be, those about others are only speculation.
More important is the termination of the conspiracy. Post-termia11 Cf. Van Huss v. United States, (10th Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 120.
66E.g., State v. Simon, 113 N.J.L. 521, 174 A. 867 (1934), affd. 115 N.J.L. 207,

178 A. 728 (1935); Ross v. State, 98 Tex. Cr. Rep. 567, 267 S.W. 499 (1924).

1174

M:rcmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 52

nation declarations are more common and carry greater weight. They
look impressive and the fine point of restricting admissions to the
party who made the declaration is often lost on a jury.
Termination occurs either when the conspiracy ends or when one
party leaves which terminates it as to him. Thereafter his declaration
may be used only against him and not against his former confederates.67
The law governing when a party resigns from a conspiracy is incidental to this paper. It is enough to note that in addition to resignation from the conspiracy,68 indictments,69 apprehension,70 or confession 71 terminate the party's involvement in the conspiracy except
under the· most unusual circumstances. The courts have been particularly strict in forbidding the admission of confessions against anyone but the confessor.72
When the conspiracy itself ends is less clear. Of course if the
conspirators are apprehended or indicted the conspiracy is usually
over but what if the conspirators achieve their aims? Or just stop
meeting? Conspiracy is a continuing crime but the courts warn:
"Though the result of the conspiracy may be continuing, the conspiracy does not thereby become a continuing one."73
Once the conspiracy has been shown, the burden is upon the conspirators to prove it has ended.74 The difficult cases are those where
a crime has been committed. The conspiracy does not necessarily
end; it continues until its aim has been achieved. Thus a conspiracy
to kidnap continued until the ransom money was passed.75 Similarly
a robbery continues until the fruits of the crime have been disposed
of.76 This is so because the aim of the conspiracy was not to commit
the crime so much as to make ·a profit by illegal means. One case
even admits declarations made after all criminal aims were achieved
as a "final settlement" of the criminal scheme.77
67Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 at 217, 67 S.Ct. 224 (1946).
68 However, it is not easy to resign from a conspiracy. See Eldredge v. United States,
(10th Cir. 1932) 62 F. (2d) 449.
69 Link v. United States, (8th Cir. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 342.
10 Graham v. United States, (8th Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 740.
11 Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 67 S.Ct. 224 (1946); Logan v. United
States, 144 U.S. 263, 12 S.Ct. 617 (1892); Gambino v. United States, (3d Cir. 1939)
108 F. (2d) 140.
.
72This principle is very old. King v. Tong, Kelyng 18 res. 5 (1663) but is still
strictly enforced. See Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 67 S.Ct. 224 (1946), and
cases therein referred to.
73 Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 at 216, 67 S.Ct. 224 (1946).
74 United States v. Pugliese, (2d Cir. 1945) 153 F. (2d) 497.
75 McDonald v. United States, (8th Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 128 at 135.
76 Murray v. United States, (7th Cir. 1925) IO F. (2d) 409 at 411.
77 United States v. Groves, (2d Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 87.
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The Krulewitch case again marks the end to expansion of the
federal rule. There, after the illegal transportation had violated the
Mann Act, certain declarations were made in the course of an attempt
to suppress evidence. The government argued that the aims of the
conspiracy had not yet been achieved. It pointed out that a conspiracy obviously includes an intention to escape punishment. Accordingly, declarations made in the course of an attempt to escape
responsibility are during "pendency." Rejecting this argument, the
Court restricted the duration of a conspiracy to its "main aim." Otherwise the conspiracy would never end. No doubt there could be a
second conspiracy to suppress evidence and declarations then made
would be admissible against its members to prove their guilty knowledge of the first crime.
A recent Supreme Court decision, however, suggests there may
still be an opening left for the admission of acts done after termination
of the conspiracy.78 If the Court refers only to circumstantial use of
such acts there is no expansion of the present law. An act however
can be used in a step of hearsay proof by showing the state of mind
of the actor,79 and as such ought to be treated the same as any other
hearsay. Any assumption that an act is more trustworthy than a declaration seems dubious.
Krulewitch is an exceptional case. Few state courts are as critical
and careful in handling the termination date. Many do admit posttermination declarations made during an attempt to suppress evidence
against conspirators not parties to the collateral offense.80 There is
the familiar talk about res gestae81 and statements of motive.82 Frequently the silence of one conspirator when accused after the conspiracy is over is taken as admission of guilt by all.83 Pendency is no
"paper rule" but, unless a confession is involved, the courts are erratic
in enforcing it.
1s Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 73 S.Ct. 481 (1953). See also Ferris v.
United States, (9th Cir. 1930) 40 F. (2d) 837. Certain defendants were arrested with
contraband liquor and kept nervously looking up the road. Other defendants came down
the road as if to meet them. The acts of the first group were admitted against the second
by way of hearsay inference from conduct, from their acts to a state of mind.
79 See Morgan, "Some Suggestions for Defining and Classifying Hearsay," 86 Umv.
PA. L. Rllv. 258 at 262 (1938).
80 Pressley v. State, 205 Ga. 197, 53 S.E. (2d) 106 (1949); State v. De Righter,
145 Ohio St. 552, 62 N.E. (2d) 332 (1945); State v. Gauthier, 113 Ore. 297, 231 P.
141 (1924). See 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 11th ed., 715 (1953).
81 Webster v. Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 369, 3 S.W. (2d) 754 (1928); Gilbert v.
Commonwealth, 228 Ky. 19, 14 S.W. (2d) 194 (1929). See also WHARTON, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE, 11th ed., §720 (1935); 6 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §1769 (1940).
82 United States v. Lutwak, (7th Cir. 1942) 195 F. (2d) 748, affd. 344 U.S. 604,
73 S.Ct. 481 (1953); United States v. Greene, (D.C. Ga. 1904) 146 F. 784.
83 See note 45 supra.
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IV
The last condition of admissibility requires "independent proof"
of the existence of the conspiracy and of the connection of the declarant and the defendant with it. The order of proof among the independent evidence ("the foundation") and the declarations is within
the trial court's discretion;84 evidence may be admitted subject to later
proof of the foundation. If the subsequent proof does not satisfy the
court, the evidence is stricken from the record or limited in application to the declarant and a cautionary instruction given the jury. If
the court admits the evidence, its determination is provisional and the
jury is charged to reconsider the adequacy of the foundation. 85
The independent evidence must amount to enough evidence to
go to a jury, a "prima facie case." It must show more than a grave
suspicion. So, in a conspiracy to bribe a public official, evidence that
the official knew certain persons to be gamblers, never molested them,
visited their place of business regularly and could not explain certain
large bank deposits amply show the existence of a conspiracy86 although the same evidence would probably not justify a conviction.
On the other hand, it is not enough to prove that all the alleged conspirators ran away together from the scene of the crime87 or that the
declarant was a boarder in the defendant's house88 or that the alleged
conspirators were close friends. 89 Nor may the foundation be established by other hearsay for "otherwise hearsay would lift itself by its
own bootstraps to the level of competent evidence." 90 A foundation
proved by testimony on the stand by a co-conspirator is adequate, for
the accused has not been denied his rights of cross-examination, oath
and confrontation.91
84 Newman v. United States, (9th Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 8. Cf. 4 WxcMoRE,
§1087 (1940).
85 People v. Talbot, 65 Cal. App. (2d) 654, 151 P. (2d) 317 (1944). Query-how
much is this worth in practice?
86 State v. Nevius, 147 Ohio St. 263, 71 N.E. (2d) 258 (1947). In Oklahoma
"slight" evidence is foundation enough. Burns v. State, 72 Okla. Cr. 432, 117 P. (2d)
155 (1941).
87Mclntosh v. Commonwealth, 272 Ky. 159, 113 S.W. (2d) 1144 (1938).
88 United States v. Nibbelink, (6th Cir. 1933)" 66 F. (2d) 178.
89Howe v. State, 186 Ind. 139, 115 N.E. 81 (1917); People v. Linde, 131 Cal. App.
12, 20 P. (2d) 704 (1933). But friendship is a relevant fact if more is added. Cf. Stevens
v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. Rep. 494, 88 S.W. (2d) 711 (1935).
90 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 at 75, 62 S.Ct. 457 (1942). See also State
v. Benson, 234 N.C. 263, 66 S.E. (2d) 893 (1951). However, hearsay admissions establish
a foundation against the admittor. State v. Price, 361 Mo. 1034, 238 S.W. (2d) 397
(1951); People v. Pierce, 387 ill. 608, 57 N.E. (2d) 345 (1944).
01 State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P. (2d) 285 (1941); State v. Stogsdill, 324
Mo. 105, 23 S.W. (2d) 22 (1929).
EvmBNCB
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We have seen that both the declarant and defendant must be
connected to the conspiracy, but how much proof of the conspiracy
itself is necessary? A doctrine has been developed in the federal
courts that only the joint venture of the conspirators must be shown.92
The declarations themselves may prove the illegality of the scheme
once the venture is established. Against such a rule it may be argued
(I) that this is no time to relax the co-conspirators' exception particularly in the light of the Krulewitch case; (2) corroboration ought
to extend equally to all parts of the offense. Nevertheless the rule
seems well advised. Proof of the joint venture, which amounts to
more than proof of mere acquaintance, is difficult enough to have real
value as corroboration. Though the declarations may alone show the
illegality of the venture, the tribunal must always be convinced beyond all reasonable doubt before conviction. Absence of some such
rule could cripple the enforcement of the antitrust, alien property, and
similar laws when the available evidence usually is documentary hearsay. Besides, without the rule, there is no support for admitting
declarations made during a legal venture which subsequently turns
illegal. 93
Analytically, the rule brings the law of conspirators' utterances
nearer harmony with the statutes requiring corroboration of accomplice
testimony in force in many states. The two rules have diverse histories, the co-conspirators' exception being a common law exception
to the hearsay rule while the rule requiring corroboration of accomplice testimony originated as a warning to the jury and was enacted
into statute in many states,94 although not in the federal jurisdiction.95
Where corroboration is required, accomplice testimony will not support a conviction unless supported by proof of "participation or identity"
of the accused. Whether the evidence is admissible hearsay or direct
evidence is irrelevant. The stress is upon connecting the accused with
the crime--not on independent proof of its occurrence. Conspirators'
evidence may be considered a species of accomplice testimony; stress
upon connection with the offense fits in well with conspiracy prose92Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 38 S.Ct. 65 (1917)
(labor disputes case); Feller v. McGrath, (D.C. Pa. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 147 (alien property case); United States v. Schneiderman, (D.C. Cal. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 892 (Smith
Act case); United States v. Vehicular Parking, (D.C. Del. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 751 ( antitrust case). See also Lanham v. Felts, 306 Ky. 851, 209 S.W. (2d) 472 (1948). Contrast People v. Livermore, 390 lli. 85, 60 N.E. (2d) 413 (1945).
93 See text to note 63 supra.
94 See generally 7 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE §§2056-2060 (1940).
95 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 37 S.Ct. 192 (1917). It is said that it
is better practice to give a cautionary warning but failure to do so is not fatal error.
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cutions where the inadequacy of the connecting proof is often complained of. Proof of conspiracy is often easier than showing the
participation of some of the defendants in it. The federal courts who
have taken the lead in simplifying the proof of the conspiracy proper
do not require corroboration of accomplice testimony. Their position
is none the less reasonable when it is remembered how broad a use
they make of the co-conspirators' exception which includes all hearsay accomplice testimony. 96 We may state the federal rules for the
use of accomplice testimony thus: accomplice testimony is good evidence and sufficient to convict by itself. Hearsay accomplice testimony is not good evidence unless it complies with the conditions of
furtherance and pendency and must be corroborated by independent
evidence.
Certain practical matters remain to be discussed. Since it is possible to admit evidence valid against only one or several defendants
in a joint trial there is always a possibility that the jury will apply
the admitted hearsay against a defendant who has not been connected
with the conspiracy. The jury room protects the secrecy of the jury's
deliberation. No matter how carefully the judge charges them, the
jury may be honestly confused or may disregard what it thinks are
lawyers' quibbles. 97 The same moral reappears: the trial judge must
control the trial, particularly against the prosecutor. If he is not
master in his own house, the case is sure to be tried on extraneous
and prejudicial matters. Mere inconvenience to the prosecution should
not justify departure from the usual order of proof because once evidence is admitted it can never really be stricken. And, since these
abuses are most likely in the mass trial for conspiracy the liberal
granting of severances ought to be encouraged as making for fairer
trials.
96 All accomplices are, of course, conspirators. Since the co-conspirators exception is
not restricted to cases of conspiracy, it covers all hearsay accomplice testimony. Should the
exception ever be restricted to conspiracy prosecutions, then it would be necessary for the
federal courts to adopt some kind of a rule limiting accomplice evidence to protect the
rights of the accused.
97 "How far a "jury which had heard evidence can in practice use it against one of
several accused and not against others is very questionable at best; most persons cannot
think in watertight compartments. However it is often necessary to tell the jury to try to do
so, when there is a joinder of several accused.•••" L. Hand, C.J., in United States v.
Pugliese, (2d Cir. 1945) 153 F. (2d) 497 at 501. See also the comments of Justice Jackson
concurring in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 at 453454, 69 S.Ct. 715 (1949),
and dissenting in Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 73 S.Ct. 481 (1953).

